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Setting the Sun on Empire: How Nationalism in the North of Ireland  
Could Protect Human Rights 
Juliet Scholes* 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, nationalist movements have re-emerged as a prominent force in global 
politics, particularly throughout Europe.1  While nationalism has a storied history across the 
European continent, the horrors of both world wars in the first half of the twentieth century inspired 
the creation of international liberal2 institutions as a means to encourage transnational cooperation 
and diplomacy, in the hopes of preventing a resurgence of the types of dangerous nationalism that 
led to the bloodiest armed conflict in modern history.3  These institutions have been largely 
successful in encouraging a cooperative international order within Europe.4  Recently, however, 
powerful nationalist movements have sprouted largely as a backlash against an influx of migrants 
and refugees and a European Union mandate of shared responsibility receive them.5  These 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., Rutgers University; B.A., Rutgers University 
College of Arts and Sciences. 
1 Fielder, infra note 84. 
2 “Liberalism,” like many other abstract political doctrines is difficult to define. For the purposes of this paper, it 
suffices to draw on John Rawls’ exposition that liberalism is an answer to the “fundamental question about political 
justice in a democratic society, namely what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair 
terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of society 
… from one generation to the next.” JOHN RAWLS, 3 POLITICAL LIBERALISM  (1993). Analogized to the global order, 
we may understand nation-states as taking the place of citizens, and voluntary international institutions as the 
society’s governing body. Thus, there is a “fair system of cooperation [by means of] … publicly recognized rules 
and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct” id. at 15–16, among 
nations “deeply divided on religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.” Id. at 10.   
3 See, e.g., John Horne, The First World War: The Aftermath , THE IRISH TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/the-first-world-war-the-aftermath-1.3452686. 
4 See, e.g., Snyder, infra note 14 at 57 (“For the first few decades following World War II, embedded liberalism … 
succeeded in granting autonomy and democratic legitimacy to nation-states while curbing aggressive nationalism”); 
see also Fielder, infra note 84 at 226 for the more blunt summation that “The EU reduces European border 
conflicts;” Fox and Vermeersch, infra note 97 at 340 (“[N]ationalism and its retrograde derivatives were 
incompatible with the EU’s plans for a postnational Europe.”).  
5 Ashok Swain, Increasing Migration Pressure and Rising Nationalism: Implications for Multilateralism and SDG 
Implementation (June 2019), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/publication/SDO_BP_Swain.pdf.  
 
 
movements have had varying political and electoral success within their countries.  The most clear-
cut example of such success for an anti-international ideology is the 2016 Brexit referendum, with 
which Great Britain voted to remove itself from the European Union.6  
Many commentators and scholars have espoused that nationalism is inherently dangerous 
for the human rights that liberal international bodies are meant to protect.7  While this is 
undoubtedly true in certain situations, particularly where nationalism is based on a theory of ethnic 
superiority, it is not universal and is better understood as too broad an assertion. In the case of 
Brexit, nationalism has indeed presented itself as a threat to the human rights of British and Irish 
citizens living under British rule in Northern Ireland.8  However, these threats could be neutralized 
by a revitalization of Northern Irish nationalism, which with political success, could expel Britain 
as its ruler and rejoin politically with the Republic of Ireland.  As the Republic of Ireland is a 
member of the European Union without plans to remove itself, nationalism in this situation would 
in fact work as a safeguard for the human rights currently protected by the European Union (EU).  
This comment seeks to challenge common conceptions of nationalism as being inherently 
dangerous, as well as definitions of human rights which do not include an economic element.  
Using Northern Ireland’s nationalist fight for home rule rather than British occupation, this 
comment will demonstrate that at least in that case, nationalism can actually protect human rights 
rather than threaten them, especially once one acknowledges that economic rights should be 
 
6 James Rodgers, Brexit Caps Nigel Farage’s Unexpected Rise, and the Triumph of Nationa lism Over Liberalism, 
NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/brexit -caps-nigel-farage-s-unexpected-rise-
triumph-nationalism-over-ncna1126881.  
7 E.g., Fielder, infra note 84 at 232 (“[Without a] European identity, nationalist identities will grow, which are often 
a platform for xenophobia, racism, and actions that will severely impact human rights.”); Fox and Vermeersch, infra 
note 97 at 343 (“Much of the recent headline grabbing nationalist activity in the region, from violence against Roma 
in Hungary to the anti-Semitic activities of skinheads in Poland, has occurred not only outside mainstream and EU 
political norms and structures but in many cases in explicit defiance of them.” (Emphasis added)). 
8 Benjamin Ward, UK’s Bid for Brexit at All Costs Will Damage Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/11/uks-bid-brexit-all-costs-will-damage-human-rights#.  
 
 
included in any characterization of human rights.  Part II of this comment will briefly delineate the 
rise of the modern European nation-state and explain the symbiotic relationship between the 
development of such states and nationalist ideologies, culminating in a short history of the pre-
WWII European nationalist movements whose existence led directly to liberal international 
institutions meant to protect human rights, such as the European Union (EU).  Part III will look at 
some of the nationalist movements with significant power in Europe today, specifically in Hungary 
and the United Kingdom, and explain how these movements endanger human rights.  Part IV will 
provide a short history of the successful nationalist movement in India, as well as an explanation 
of the historical underpinnings of nationalism in Northern Ireland. It will then posit an argument 
that political success for Northern Irish nationalists today could actually protect against the threats 
to human rights posed by Brexit. 
II. A Brief History of The Modern Nation and Nationalism 
In today’s world, it is difficult to envision a global order without  nation-states.  In many 
ways, the international regime and some of the most pressing cross-border issues have already 
moved beyond the actions of national governments and instead are dominated by globalized non-
state actors.9  However, simple logic tells us that the modern conception of a nation-state had to 
have developed at some point, or we would still be in the age of empires. This leaves questions 
of  what defines a modern nation and when the nation as we know it came to exist, and the 
 
9 The most obvious example of this is political violence, or its more commonplace term of terrorism, committed 
frequently by “the quintessential illegal non-state actor,” namely, transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or 
Boko Haram. Neal A. Pollard, Globalization’s Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law, 210 
INT’L LAW, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT & LAW ENFORCEMENT 211 (2002). However, there are several less glaring 
examples of non-state actors displacing the roles associated with the state, such as multinational corporations 
operating as “a substitute for the market as a method of organizing international exchange” Stephen Hymer, The 
Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations, 441 THE AM. ECON. REV. 441 (1970) and of course the 
subject of human rights, which though “ultimately implemented and ensured by states,” are greatly influenced by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International. WENDY WONG, 29  INTERNAL AFFAIRS: HOW 
THE STRUCTURE OF NGOS TRANSFORMS HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).  
 
 
subsequent question of the role nationalism played in that development or vice versa. This 
section provides necessary background information on the rise of the modern European nation, 
the phases of European nationalism which occurred in conjunction with the switch from 
monarchies to constitutional democracies, and the creation of international institutions to prevent 
recurrence of the evils brought on by some of those nationalist movements.  
A. The Spring of Nations: The Development of the Modern European Nation in 1848 
 
Europe is no stranger to nationalism.  While many people today would think of the 
European kingdoms of the late Middle Ages as “nations,” most nations as we now define them10 
did not exist until after the French and American Revolutions in the late eighteenth-century.11  Of 
course, human beings have been grouped territorially and with at least a myth of common ancestry 
since far before that, and “in most cases, [there is] a more or less powerful link between modern 
nations and pre-existing, and often pre-modern, [ethnic communities].”12  While more civic-
focused elements later came to relevance in the evolution from ethnic communities to “nations,” 
one still present and important aspect of many national identities is its “ethno-history,” or the 
shared, subjective understanding of the communal history as opposed to the objective version of 
it that an outsider might describe.13  As time went on, modern states “increasingly fused with [their] 
 
10 The sociologist Anthony Smith defines a modern nation as “a named human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a  mass, public culture, a  common economy and common legal 
rights and duties for all members,” Smith, infra note 11, at 24. For others, a  “nation” can be found where “a majority 
of the designated population participates in public life” or where “a sign ificant minority of the population outside the 
ruling elite reveal a national consciousness.” Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted). These alternative definitions, however, 
are both too overinclusive, in that the latter could include territorial kingdoms going b ack well before anything like a 
modern nation could be said to exist, and too underinclusive, in that the former would call into question whether a 
democratic country in which the majority of voting-eligible citizens do not vote is indeed a “nation.” For Smith, 
these definitions would more appropriately describe “pre-nations,” as they could exist before the key processes of 
nation development (i.e., territorialization, homogenization, legal standardization) occurred to create a modern 
nation. Id. 
11 Anthony Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism, in  NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: A READER 24 
(Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, eds., 2005).  
12 Id. at 25.  
13 Id. at 28.  
 
 
nation[s],” as powerful social and civic institutions like government education systems and legal 
codes developed symbiotically with a social contract between the members of the nation, who 
demanded the right to participate in its governance, and the government, which was to provide 
such institutions in exchange for the “blood and treasure” given it by its people.14  Even the 
territorial aspect of the modern nation was an innovation at this time—for most monarchical 
societies, governance was not confined by strict geographical boundaries, but was exercised as 
“different bundles of powers over different areas and groups.”15 
In the European context, the beginnings of the modern conception of a nation trace back to 
the first half of the nineteenth-century, when, in England, some property-owners were given the 
right to vote and cities became able to elect Members of Parliament, and in France, the long-
standing monarchical power was tempered by a constitution which provided a system of selective 
electoralism for a lower parliamentary house.16  Even with these radical changes, the difference 
between pure monarchy and these allegedly different systems was negligible: in England only 
three percent of the population was enfranchised, and in France, a paltry one-half of one percent 
was enfranchised.17   
Monarchies and entrenched elite powers already viewed nationalist  movements as an 
existential threat by this early point,18 but many in the French aristocracy still considered Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s January 1848 forebodings that they were “‘sleeping in a volcano … [and that] 
the wind of revolution [was] in the air’” to be an overly dramatic perception of reality.19  
 
14 Jack Snyder, The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back , 98 FOREIGN AFF. 54, at 55 (2019). Snyder also 
points out that in some regions, states developed in areas not ethnically homogenous, and homogeneity occurred by 
the decidedly less civil means of ethnic cleansing and expulsion. Id. at 55 (citing Ernest Gellner generally).  
15 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: A READER 65 (Philip Spencer and 
Howard Wollman, eds., 2005). 
16 Mike Rapport, 1848: YEAR OF REVOLUTION 2 (2009).  
17 Id. at 3.  
18 Id. at 4. 
19 Id. at 42. 
 
 
Tocqueville’s premonition, however, soon proved to be quite accurate; just the next month, mass 
protests against the monarchy and its associated elite took hold of Paris, and with the nascent 
technological developments of railways, steamships, and telegraphs, news of the revolt spread 
quickly to other European kingdoms and inspired popular demand for constitutional government 
and its related institutions.20   
Like the exponential rate at which such technologies developed during this industrial age, 
so too did the winds of radical governmental change blow quickly.  Just the next month after the 
February revolution in France, workers and students organized mass demonstrations throughout 
the German states, and dozens of delegates from said states assembled to collectivize demands for 
“‘a more complete assembly of trusted men from all German peoples,’ [and] a ‘pre-parliament’ 
[…] to arrange elections for a German national assembly,’ which in turn would draft an all-German 
constitution.”21   
These particular demands exemplify the modern idea of a collective nation comprised of a 
common ethnic people operating a democratic liberal government.  This combination of ethnic-
based coalition-building and constitutional governance thus far typical of this pivotal year also 
took hold of the Magyar ethnic group in what is now called Hungary, where liberal-minded 
revolutionaries made many of the demands as their French and German counterparts, but with a 
more decided emphasis on ethnicity or nationality: their list of requirements included the expulsion 
of non-Hungarian troops as well as the absorption of Transylvania from Romania.22  
The tenets of the Hungarian uprising quickly proved to be the harbinger of attitudes that 
were to flourish throughout the rest of these blossoming European republics.  In France, the seed 
 
20 Id. at 57—58; Rapport notes that in Germany, for example, revolutionaries demanded not just constitutions, but 
also a free press, jury trials, and a popular militia . Id.  
21 Id. at 59 (citations omitted).  
22 Rapport, supra note 16 at 68. 
 
 
which had sprouted the continental push toward republic-building, the republican uprising 
organizers sought to parlay their country’s famed revolutionary spirit into “an energetic foreign 
policy … sending patriotic armies bursting forth, liberating Italy and Poland and spreading the 
gospel of democracy.”23  While they saw their success in establishing a provisional democratic 
government as but one piece of a continental puzzle, the actual members of that government were 
less inclined to support revolution elsewhere, and in order to extinguish ideas of transnational 
solidarity, they appealed to nationalist sentiment.24 
B. Nationalism in Europe  
 
While democratic constitutions did not begin coming to fruition until the mid- 
nineteenth Century, nationalism was easy to find on the European continent well before that.  There 
are varying definitions of nationalism. For some, nationalism is “an awareness shared by a group 
of people who feel strongly attached to a particular land and who possess a common culture and 
common history marked by shared glories and sufferings.”25  This conception of nationalism 
centers ethnic commonality as its most important factor.  Others would define nationalism as more 
focused on the civic or political unit of the nation, identifying it as “the doctrine that the cultural 
unit of the nation, whether defined along civic or ethnic lines, should be congruent with the 
political unit of the state.”26  Although there is a possible ethnic element in this definition of 
nationalism, what separates it from historical ethnic collectivism is that its primary marker is that 
“political loyalties … coincide with national boundaries.”27  Still others define nationalism along 
different lines, such as Smith’s definition of “an ideological movement for attaining and 
 
23 Id. at 114. 
24 Id. at 115. Rapport notes that the “firebrands” did not listen to the nationalist urgings, however, and still pushed 
for cross-border solidarity in overthrowing monarchies. Id.  
25 Marvin Perry, The Evolution of Modern European Nationalism, 13 J. OF EAST AND WEST STUDIES 23, at 23. 
26 Snyder, supra note 14, at 54.  
27 Id. 
 
 
maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose members deem it to 
constitute an actual or potential nation.”28   
While these definitions certainly share similarities and are likely applicable to many of the 
same iterations of so-called nationalist movements, the lack of a precise definition serves as an apt 
symbol for the failure of political and academic commentary to take into account the sometimes 
subtle but frequently significant differences between the various movements.  A failure to 
acknowledge that not all of these movements are the same lends legitimacy to the argument that 
the more invidious of these movements are the victims of bias, thus enabling them to garner 
sympathy.   
Such failure is commonplace: one scholar suggests, “Elie Kedourie’s definition … remains 
widely accepted: a nationalist doctrine ‘holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that 
nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate 
type of government is national self-government.’”29 While this definition might not be in actual 
contradiction with the others noted (or the countless alternatives found throughout various 
academic disciplines), it is perhaps over-encompassing (individual nationalist movements might 
not necessarily care whether other countries or people are self-governed, and indeed, many of them 
believe that their own group’s ethnic superiority demands that they govern other “inferior” 
territorial ethnic groups), and clearly the assertion that this is the accepted definition is overstated, 
as is evidenced by the existence of so many different conceptualizations.   
A belief that all “nationalist” movements truly belong under the same umbrella term is also 
plainly inaccurate and should be corrected for its own sake: the nationalist movement of Northern 
 
28 Smith, supra note 11, at 30.   
29 Brian Porter, The Social Nation and Its Figures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late Nineteenth -
Century Warsaw, 101 THE AM. HIST. REV. 1470, 1472 (1996) (citing Elie Kedourie, NATIONALISM 9 (3rd ed. 
1960)). 
 
 
Ireland bears little resemblance to many of the nationalist movements throughout the rest of 
Europe and it is a disservice to its supporters to co-categorize them. Part of the difficulty in 
precisely defining nationalism comes from the significant variances among movements all 
claiming to be “nationalist.” As will be explained, Northern Irish nationalism has traditionally 
sought different aims than many other European nationalist movements, but it is necessary to 
provide background of European nationalism before those differences can be properly understood.   
1. Historical Nationalism in Europe 
 
To understand today’s rising nationalism, it is crucial to understand the historical tradition 
from which it derived. As Marvin Perry notes, “[t]he essential components of modern nationalism 
emerged at the time of the French Revolution [because] [t]he Revolution asserted the principle that 
sovereignty was derived from the nation, the people as a whole.”30 Thus, well before the 1848 
Spring of Nations, the idea that the state was the product of its people rather than its monarch had 
significant support.31  It is this ideology, that the people of a nation are the source of that nation’s 
power, that allowed for the symbiotic development of modern, anti-monarchical nations, and 
nationalism.32  For the Jacobin revolutionaries, the nation took the place in the heart that was 
typically held by religion: it became the only non-trivial thing, deserving of total reverence.33   The 
newly conceptualized relationship between the nation and its people, though, also gave those 
people a quasi-religious importance in that “[t]he modern state was now regarded as deriving its 
sovereignty from the people, not from God.”34  
 
30 Perry, supra note 25, at 24.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 25 (citing J.H. Hayes, THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN EUROPEAN NATIONALISM 55 (Richard R. 
Smith, 1931)).  
34 Breuilly, supra note 15, at 66.  
 
 
Some of the same voices of the French Revolution, however, also envisioned the nation-
state not just as an object of revery in its own right, but as the essential mechanism through which 
individual liberty, equality, and the ideals of the Enlightenment could be protected.35  Thus was 
born the arguably fundamental tension between nationalism and liberalism, as a focus on the 
interests of the French in particular was difficult to square with the principles of universal 
equality.36   
In much the same way that the ideas behind the 1848 revolutions would later naturally 
spread throughout Europe, the premise of nationalism took root in other parts of the continent at 
around the same time that they did in France.37  In some cases, these developments were 
concurrent.  Hungary, notably, underwent a radical shift from feudalism to liberalism as part of 
the 1848 sea change in only a few weeks.38  Hungarian liberalism was heavily dependent on ethnic 
considerations, with a focus on Magyar independence from the Hapsburg Empire; when parliament 
increased suffrage rights, it was only for male speakers of Magyar.39  The Hungarian liberal agenda 
went beyond voting rights, and also included press freedom, religious freedom, and an end to the 
effective caste system of serfdom and nobility privilege.40 But nationalism lurked as a 
simultaneous powerful force in the movement for radical Hungarian change, as the Magyars 
sought not only to increase the power outside of the imperial elite, but also to annex land beyond 
 
35 Perry, supra note 25, at 25.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 26. Perry notes that, for example, the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, in the late 18 th century, 
coined the term “Volksgeist,” or, “the soul of the people” to describe the idea that “each people was unique and 
creative” and that they expressed this uniqueness culturally, through language, literature, and folk traditions. This 
German cultural nationalism, however, embraced a monarchical government as an expression of that rich past, 
instead rejecting French ideas of state-enforced liberty. Id. at 26—27. 
38 Perry, supra note 25, at 28. 
39 Id. Language fluency and gender, of course, were not the only requirements of suffrage, as only male Magyar 
speakers who owned property were enfranchised. Id.  
40 Id.  
 
 
their own territory in the hopes of (in their eyes) improving its Serb, Slovak, and Rumanian 
inhabitants into national and cultural Hungarians.41  
In England, the seeds of nationalism42 were planted even sooner than elsewhere on the 
continent.43  Because of its geographic isolation from the rest of Europe, England was uniquely 
able to develop “the growth of a national feeling” as early as the seventeenth century.44  In England, 
this nascent nationalist sentiment fell on the side of the chasm wherein it progressed in tandem 
with liberalist ideas, rather than in opposition to them. Because the English were able to look 
inward and improve domestic economic conditions, the conditions for individual liberty, a uniform 
legal code, parliamentary willingness to care about public opinion, and an end to feudalism were 
ripe.45  Perhaps it is due to this long history of nationalist thought in England that it “was the first 
country where a national consciousness deeply embraced the whole people.”46   
2. Pre-World War European Nationalism 
 
If the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries largely birthed European nationalism, the turn 
and first half of the twentieth century saw its apex, and the point at which its dangerous potential 
became impossible to ignore.  Although nationalism is essentially about promoting the union of 
the national people and the apparatus of the state, it cannot be ignored that “nationalism is as much 
 
41 Id.  
42 The conceptual existence of English nationalism is arguable, and frequently argued.  While Newman makes the 
argument that English nationalism not only exists but is comparable to other common forms of nation -state 
nationalism, Kumar posits that as an imperialist nation England’s brand of nationalism can only be compared to the 
quite different forms typical of Russian or Turk nationalism. Still others would argue that English nationalism as 
distinct from United Kingdom nationalism does not exist at all. Compare Gerald Newman, THE RISE OF ENGLISH 
NATIONALISM (1987) with Krishan Kumar, Empire and English Nationalism, 12 NATIONS AND NAT’LISM 1 and 
Jeremy Black, Book Review, FOR. AFF., Mar./Apr. 2019. 
43 Hans Kohn, The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism, 1 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 69, 70 (1940). Kohn 
points out that Tudor rule “laid the foundations for that national homogeneity which was the necessary condition for 
the later development of nationalism” in the late fifteenth century. Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 91.  
 
 
about exclusion as it is about inclusion.”47   As Perry notes, “[e]xtreme nationalism was a general 
European phenomenon, but it was especially dangerous in Germany.”48  There, by the end of the 
nineteenth century the Volkish thought tradition had evolved from more benign pride in German 
cultural tradition to a belief in the inherent superiority of the German spirit, and the implication 
that Germany should reject the Western liberalist order in favor of its own national traditions.49   
Germany, though, was not the only example of nationalist-inspired danger, and this danger 
would soon prove catastrophic.  Proponents of the liberal order in the previous century had 
mistakenly imagined that the replacement of overreaching monarchies with nationality-based 
states would lead to peace between them.50  However, the underpinnings of racial supremacy that 
had taken hold of nationalist movements like that of Germany now led these nations to believe that 
subjugation of others was appropriate.51  One salient example of this is the German nationalist 
argument against the minority Poles in Prussia in the late nineteenth century.52  In later years, 
Hitler would build Nazism off of both this disdain for other ethnic groups and the related belief 
that the Germans were entitled to expand their nation, writing in Mein Kampf that “‘[t]he only 
thing that will ensure a people its freedom of existence … is sufficient space on this earth.’”53  The 
consequences of this ideology need not be recounted here. 
 But it is not just the nationalism within an ethnic majority that can lead to warfare. As Van 
Evera notes, nationalist-driven policies which oppress minorities can lead to reactionary violence 
by either inspiring violent backlash directly from those oppressed groups, or by motivat ing the 
 
47 Oliver Zimmer, NATIONALISM IN EUROPE: 1890-1940 50 (2003). As will be later addressed, there is an important 
distinction between different nationalist movements based on who the movement seeks to “exclude.” 
48 Perry, supra note 25 at 30.  
49 Id. at 30—31.  
50 Id. at 36.  
51 Id.  
52 Zimmer, supra note 47 at 55.  
53 Anthony D. Smith, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 74 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 
 
homelands of the oppressed to instigate violence against the oppressor nations.54  The obvious 
example of this possibility is Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by the Serbian nationalist 
Gavrilo Princip in response to the Austro-Hungarian empire’s annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.55  Though of course there were myriad others, this assassination is frequently touted 
as one of the primary causes of the first World War.56 
C. International Law in Response to the Great Wars 
After the conclusion of the First World War, the victorious European states combined 
efforts with the United States to recreate the international order such that the vulnerabilities which 
had led to such a large-scale disastrous conflict would not be repeated.57  In particular, the victors 
gave significant attention to the abrogation of minority rights which had contributed to nationalistic 
resentment and transnational aggression.58  The solution that this effort reached was the creation 
of an international regime intended to resolve such tensions: in creating the League of Nations and 
redrawing the European map, nationalism was indeed viewed as potentially problematic (owing to 
the concern regarding the subjugation of minorities), but it was also for the first time a relevant 
factor in the creation of state boundaries.59   
In addition to the focus on human rights in the post-war peace deals, the victor countries 
focused heavily on economic factors, namely by requiring Germany to pay massive reparations 
both as a punishment for its war guilt and as a means to ensure it could not afford to go to war 
 
54 Stephanie Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, 18 INT’L SEC. 5, 14 (1994).  
55 See, e.g., Not Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/archives/archduke-franz-ferdinand-world-war.  
56 See, e.g., id.; IND. DEP’T OF EDUC.: World War I Resources, 
https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/standards/guide.pdf. 
57 See, e.g., Horne, supra note 3.  
58 Rhona K.M. Smith, 20–21 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (9th ed. 2020). 
59 Id. 
 
 
again for a long time.60  The peace treaties reduced Germany’s territory by a whopping fourteen 
percent and its population by over six million citizens.61  As previously noted, transforming one 
nation’s citizens into another’s ethnic minority can lead to dangerous forms of nationalism.62 This 
section will briefly explain the creation of liberal international institutions as a means to prevent 
World War III and to protect the human rights of the citizens of their member states. It will then 
posit that “human rights” as a concept is frequently understood incompletely, as in many 
conceptualizations economic rights are left out of the definition. 
1. Post-WWI Liberalism 
In 1945, following the horrors of World War II, fifty-one countries once again saw fit to 
attempt a regression into such violence and this time created the United Nations (UN).63 The 
following year, the League of Nations was formally dissolved and its mandate given instead to the 
UN.64  Once again, economics played a significant factor in the post-war order, this time at the 
1944 Bretton Woods conference, culminating in the creation of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).65 While these institutions focused on regulating possible 
fluctuations in the international market through loans and financial aid,66 the 1948 Marshall Plan 
provided for U.S. aid to western European countries, stipulated on open transnational markets as 
a boost to the liberal cooperation of international workers.67 
 
60 See, e.g., Olivia Lang, Why Has Germany Taken so Long to Pay off its WWI Debt?, BBC (Oct. 2, 2010), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11442892.  
61 Klaus Schwabe, World War I and the Rise of Hitler, 38 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 864, 864 (2014).  
62 Van Evera, supra note 54.  
63 U.N.: HISTORY OF THE UN (2015). 
64 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2020).  
65 Snyder, supra note 14, at 57.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 56—57. 
 
 
Though human rights law has a complex and disputed history,68 for the purpose of 
understanding how modern nationalist movements can affect human rights, the crucial starting 
point is the post-WW2 years, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) by the UN in 1948.69  Based on this Declaration, The Council of Europe (which had also 
been founded following the War with the aim of protecting human rights and promoting 
democracy), drafted and signed its own European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 
1950.70   
 2. Economic Rights as Human Rights 
 Although many of the rights guaranteed by the UDHR and the ECHR overlap, and the 
latter contains a “Safeguard for existing human rights” which states that “[n]othing in this 
Convention shall be construed as limiting … any of the human rights … which may be ensured 
[under other existing agreements between parties],” one noticeable difference between the two 
documents is the lack of an equivalent to the UDHR Article 23 right to work in the ECHR.71  
During the drafting of the UDHR, head of the drafting committee Eleanor Roosevelt parlayed her 
long-held belief in the importance of labor rights into ensuring that international labor 
organizations held a prominent role in the document’s development.72  It is not by mere chance 
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that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was one of few parts of the League of Nations 
that also played a key role in drafting the UN’s Declaration; rather, it owes to Mrs. Roosevelt and 
the inclusion of a American Federation of Labour (AFL) representative in the full-time staff of the 
UN that workers’ rights were considered an indispensable piece of the new peace.73   
Article 23 guarantees, in four short sentences, that everyone has the right to work freely 
and in just conditions, the right to equal pay for equal work without discrimination, the right to 
just remuneration sufficient to ensure “an existence worthy of human dignity,” and the right to 
collectively bargain in the form of trade unions.74  The vision of the ILO that was absorbed by the 
UN was not based solely on ensuring fair labor for its own sake, but on the understanding that 
“universal, lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice.”75  It was, to them, 
quite clear that labor rights were part and parcel of human rights, having just witnessed the use of 
slave labor as one aspect of the most egregious human rights violations known to man.76 
 Two short years later, though, when the Council of Europe set forth its own human rights 
document, this element was absent.77  Although trade unionists were in attendance as part of the 
roughly eight hundred delegates at the 1948 Hague Congress, they likely lacked in relative 
prominence among the mélange of participants that included famous politicians and heads of state, 
philosophers, poets laureate, and various other cosmopolitans, led by Winston Churchill.78  
Perhaps it is owing to this more obscure position than that of unionists in the first iteration of the 
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UN that workers’ rights were decentered, and not formally recognized in the resulting rights-
protecting document.79   
 The post-war liberal institutions with a purely economic focus like the IMF, the European 
Economic Community (the predecessor to the EU), and the World Bank operate in such a way as 
to promote a world order in which states retain general autonomy while entering into a sort of 
shared sovereignty.80  To accomplish this, they employ a general design of “regulat[ing] policy 
externalities arising from societal interactions across borders.”81  By contrast, human rights-
focused regimes are primarily aimed at “hold[ing] governments accountable for purely internal 
activities.”82 
 Perhaps the belief that economic rights are not as serious as human rights (or else their 
domestic violation would too be the concern of the international community) derives from these 
operational differences, or perhaps from the exclusion of workers and economic rights from one 
of the primary human rights documents; regardless, human rights scholarship frequently has the 
unfortunate viewpoint that “economic freedoms … [are] not an element of human rights.”83  In 
reality, the right to work and its companion protections are vital to the security of human rights: 
when people cannot work, inequality and instability flourish. Human rights violations are more 
likely to occur under these conditions than under a fairer economic paradigm.84   
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Thus, it is imperative to acknowledge that socio-economic rights cannot be divorced from 
human rights conversations without “exacerbate[ing] many of the evils [human rights policies] set 
out to eradicate.”85 The frequent absence of economic and labor rights from human rights 
definitions artificially narrows the field to the detriment of the people whose rights most need 
protecting, namely those with little social or fiscal capital.  To adequately address human rights 
concerns, we must understand that socio-economic rights are as vital as more obvious rights, like 
those of freedom from torture or arbitrary detention.  By recognizing labor rights as equally 
important, those interested in maintaining peace, stability, and human rights for all will be better 
equipped to prevent the human rights atrocities which skulk in the wake of these types of softer 
rights violations. 
III. European Nationalism Redux 
 While the liberal institutionist experiment has had success in staving off nationalist 
surges in Europe,86 they are now once again on the rise in several areas.87  Two particularly note-
worthy examples are the powerful Hungarian nationalist movement, helmed by the political 
party Fidesz, and the movement in Great Britain that propelled the idea of Brexit to success.88  
This section will explain first the background of modern Hungarian nationalism, followed by the 
threats that movement presents to human rights. It will then delineate how Brexit relates to 
nationalism and how it also threatens human rights, specifically for those living in Northern 
Ireland.  
A. Modern Hungarian Nationalism 
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 Since WWII and the subsequent formation of the EU, there has been relative peace among 
its member states.89  As with the other previously described liberal international institutions, the 
EU (and its forerunner the EEC) seeks to achieve its goal of transnational cooperation by means 
of “‘some surrender of sovereignty’” by its members in service of a regulatory, rights-protecting 
supranational organization.90  While this structure has been seen and promoted as a necessary 
ingredient in the EU’s ultimate goal of preventing war and human rights abuses, after several 
decades of success it is now facing significant backlash.91  Not unlike the nationalist movements 
of the eighteenth century, today several such camps have gained popularity and political traction 
globally, largely as a response to widening economic inequality, belief in the decrease of national 
sovereignty, and, importantly, disruptions to demography and cultural hegemony.92   
While nationalism has seen a revival and political success all over the world, its surge in 
Europe in recent years has been particularly widespread.93  This backlash to the dominant 
international order became increasingly prominent across the continent in response to international 
power player Germany’s opening of its borders to a large influx of refugees in 2015.94 Belgium, 
the seat of the EU, then applied pressure on other EU member states to alleviate some of the 
demand on Germany by also accepting migrants.95  New European nationalism has drawn more 
attention than similar movements in other parts of the world both because it flies in the face of a 
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supranational order that has seemingly been mostly successful, and because of its British 
iteration’s success in the Brexit referendum.96  Other than Britain, one particularly representative 
embodiment of the forces driving European nationalism is Hungary. 
1. The Nationalist Movement in Hungary 
 Given its history as a classic site for nationalist sentiment, it should come as no surprise 
that in the modern wave of nationalism Hungary is and has been a leader.  In the 1990s, before 
Hungary joined the EU, its Fidesz (Young Democrats) party leaned left and did not enjoy 
significant political power.97  In response to a poor showing in the 1990 elections, however, Fidesz 
rebranded itself as the representation of the nationalist right, which led in subsequent elections to 
greater gains.98  For Fidesz and its supporters, the Hungarian nation is defined not solely by its 
territorial borders, but includes the ethnic Hungarians living outside of them.99  Fidesz has been 
remarkably adept at transforming the political conversation in Hungary, effectively changing the 
competition from a left vs. right debate to one “between those forces that represented the nation 
and those forces that, by extension, did not.”100  This transition allowed Fidesz to reframe issues 
to reflect this divide.101 But interestingly, even with this nationalist agenda, EU membership was 
generally supported on all sides of the political divide.102  For a nationalist party, EU membership 
seems counterintuitive, but for Fidesz’s agenda of representing the interests of all ethnic 
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Hungarians, the EU served as a vessel through which it could achieve a “borderless Hungarian 
nation.”103 
 However, after defeat at the polls in 2002, Fidesz leader Victor Orbán pushed his party 
further right, rejecting liberalist ideals and blaming his loss on the med ia and inclusive 
democracy.104  Appealing to the cultural memory of former Soviet control over the region, Orbán  
“depicted Brussels, the site of E.U. headquarters, as ‘the new Moscow.’”105  Orbán’s newfound 
disdain for the EU was prescient: years before Belgium would ask EU members to accept migrants, 
Orbán anticipated their upcoming arrival, and purposefully stoked anti-Muslim prejudice.106  In 
the years following Fidesz’s political defeat, Orbán and his ilk also shored up significant support 
from anti-Semitic and anti-Roma political groups.107  The coalition of these supporters launched 
Fidesz back into the majority of the national parliament, with Orbán regaining his role as prime 
minister in 2010.108   
 2. Nationalist Threat to Human Rights in Hungary 
 With his second election to the post of prime minister, Orbán quickly set out to concentrate 
and entrench power in himself, using all tools at his disposal to take over Hungarian media and 
weaken any possibility of a judiciary check, and attacking political critics and any groups receiving 
funding from outside of Hungary.109  Orbán has also ramped up anti-immigrant, pro-
ethnonationalist sentiment within Hungary to alarming levels.110  This hostility to immigrants, 
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minorities, and the EU power structure has gone beyond mere (though still dangerous) rhetoric 
and manifested in actual policy. Significantly, in 2001, Fidesz sponsored and passed the Status 
Law, which allowed for Hungarians living beyond the country’s borders to apply for Hungarian 
Identity Cards which granted their holders special access to the Hungarian labor market and other 
entitlements.111  Although not inherently anti-minority, this law represented danger in its rejection 
of EU anti-discrimination and favoritism mandates112 and delivered a message of Hungarian ethnic 
superiority. Following pushback from the EU for these reasons, Hungary amended the law by 
extending its labor provisions to all applicants in neighbor countries but kept in place the 
Hungarian Identity Cards,113 effectively removing the international legal barriers while still 
asserting Hungarian supremacy.   
 This digression from the liberal institutions which have served as a guard against human 
rights violations has shown several sides in Hungary of late. The structure of the EU has, somewhat 
ironically, contributed to rebellion against it. It is not just the requirement that member nations 
sacrifice some of their sovereign power as a requirement to join that leads some critics to complain 
it is antidemocratic: there has also been growing discontent among some members about the fact 
that governance of the EU is left not to elected officials, but to experts.114  Where the divide 
between democratically-backed accountability and liberalism becomes too wide, illiberal 
nationalism has a tendency to rear its head.115  What is ironic, however, is that the solution (at least 
in the case of Hungary) is not to assert and ensure increased democracy, but instead to replace 
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liberalism with authoritarianism.116  Describing Hungary’s trajectory in such a way is no mere 
exercise in conjecture: in a 2014 speech, Orbán himself asserted that Hungary would no longer be 
a liberal nation, and instead would become a work-based state in the vein of China, Russia, and 
Turkey.117  In the place of democratic liberalism, Orbán envisions a Hungary of “one [party …] 
built on ‘ethnonationalist foundations.’”118 
Since then, Orbán has made good on this promise, and Hungary’s hostility to minority 
groups and immigrants has steadily increased. During the 2015 European migrant crisis, almost 
400,000 mostly Muslim asylum-seekers crossed the border from Serbia into Hungary.119  Although 
a substantial portion of them were only passing through Hungary en route to Germany, which had 
pledged to take in one million refugees, this large a throng tested the capacity of the smaller and 
less wealthy state.120  In response to this incident and generally to the European refugee crisis, 
Hungary has passed a spate of anti-immigrant policies.121  One well-publicized such policy was 
the erection of barbed wire fences around various points of the Hungarian border.122  Shortly after, 
Orbán created “transit zones” on the Hungarian-Serbian border, followed by a policy mandating 
that any asylum-seekers had to apply for that status from such a transit zone, wherein they must 
remain detained for the entirety of the process.123   
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Although Orbán has claimed at times that “Hungarians have ‘no problems’ with the local 
Muslim community,”124 he has also publicly stated that “Hungarians have ‘the right not to live 
together with populous Muslim communities.’”125  Thus, observers of Hungarian policy in recent 
years are likely to note that, although Viktor Orbán has denied charges of racism and 
xenophobia,126 the laws which he and his party have promoted tell a different story.  In addition to 
the more obvious threats to the human rights of minorities and immigrants in Hungary evident 
from these new laws, there are somewhat subtler tells of Fidesz’s disregard for the human rights-
centered post-WWII world order. One interesting example is the 2014 construction, in the midst 
of the already existing monuments to various points in Hungarian history dotting Budapest’s 
Freedom Square, of a seemingly innocuous Memorial to the Victims of the German Occupation.127   
Without context, one would struggle to conjure anyone more worthy of memorialization 
than the victims of German aggression in WWII. However, the context here is vital: in reality, the 
entrance of the Nazis into Hungary was less an “occupation” than it was “the unimpeded 
movement of German soldiers onto friendly territory.”128   Glossing over this fact (and arguably 
going beyond that to historical revisionism) ignores the fact that Nazi action in Hungary was both 
specifically anti-Semitic and actively assisted by the Hungarian state.129  This disturbing 
development highlights the very real dangers to human rights presented by Orbán’s reframing of 
a clearly anti-Muslim policy shift as simply being aimed at the protection of Hungarian culture, 
customs, and “Christian tradition.”130 
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B. British Nationalism and Brexit 
 While nationalism has reared its many heads throughout large swaths of the globe as of 
late,131 a handful of iterations have garnered significant attention as compared to others.  In 
particular, the media attention to the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the United States need not 
be recited here, though it is useful to note that Trump himself has compared his election to the 
Brexit vote, calling it “‘the exact same thing.’”132  Two years later, in the global south, Jair 
Bolsonaro was elected President of Brazil, drawing comparisons to Trump133 and with 
commentators and scholars noting that many of the extremist tactics taken by Bolsonaro and his 
supporters are following the playbook utilized by far-right Trump supporters.134  Even before 
Trump’s rise in global recognition, the oppressive regimes of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in Russia and Turkey, respectively, exemplified dangerous nationalist agendas in action.  
For the new European nationalists, though, the most encouraging political development has been 
the 2016 referendum in Britain to leave the EU, or Brexit.135  Though it has yet to go into effect, 
the effects of Brexit have been noticeable even outside of Britain; not long after England’s136 vote 
to leave the EU, the newly-developed Nationalist Europe and Freedom Coalition (a group of far-
 
131 While nationalism has until recently been “relatively dormant in Europe, [it] was alive and well elsewhere in the 
world” in the post-WWII era , as many regions grappled with bringing colonization and its legacies to an end. 
Fielder, supra note 84, at 217.  
132 Id. at 222 (quoting Ralf Michaels, Does Brexit Spell the Death of Transnational Law? , 17 GER. L. J. 51, 51 
(2016)). 
133 See, e.g., Jair Bolsonaro: Brazil’s Firebrand Leader Dubbed the Trump of the Tropics , B.B.C. NEWS (Dec. 31, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45746013.  
134Dom Phillips “The Playbook is the American Alt-right”: Bolsonaristas Follow Familiar Extremist Tactics, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/27/american-alt-right-playbook-
bolsonaro-extremist-tactics-brazil.  
135 Fielder, supra note 84, at 221.  
136Though the Brexit vote implicates consequences for all of Britain, both Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to 
remain in the EU. Fielder, supra note 84, at 214 (citing Patrick Cockburn, Brexit Unleashed an English Nationalism 
That Has Damaged the Union with Scotland for Good , THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-scottish-referendum-english-nationalism-damaged-union-for-good-
a7635796.html).   
 
 
right leaders from across the European continent) met two times within one year, and brought 
attention to the Brexit vote as a success for the nationalist movement.137   
 1. Brexit as a Nationalist Success 
 Any political development which results from a democratic vote is open to interpretation 
as to its ultimate causes, but the true reasons behind Brexit are particularly elusive, or as one writer 
describes it, “Brexit is a Rorschach blot into which everybody reads their own preoccupations.”138  
However, even with this lack of consensus, one “universally accepted [interpretation] is that it was 
a triumph of English nationalism.”139  One rather modern approach to understanding the myriad 
reasons that voters in Britain chose to leave the EU,140 undertaken by researchers from City, 
University of London, analyzed conversation on the topic on Twitter, and found that roughly 
seventy-five percent of tweets about Brexit espoused nationalist sentiments.141  This should come 
as no surprise, given the origins of Brexit as a concept; undoubtedly, [w]ithout Nigel Farage, there 
would have been no referendum in the first place.”142  As far back as 2003, Farage has been 
attempting to rally the English to leave the EU.143  In his speech to the European Parliament just 
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after the Brexit vote, Farage left no doubt that nationalism was the driving force behind his 
campaign, noting that what Brexiteers did was “[reject] the multinationals.”144  
 2. Brexit as a Threat to Human Rights 
 Just as uncertainty regarding Brexit voters’ true motivations abounds, so too does that 
regarding what its ultimate effects will be.  It is reasonable, though, to presume that it will 
ultimately have a negative effect on human rights.  In the lead up to the referendum, Nigel Farage 
made clear that in addition to his general aversion to multinationalism, his motivations for leading 
the Brexit charge also laid in wanting to curb immigration into the UK. One highly publicized 
incident which took place just before the referendum vote involved Farage’s posting of an anti-
immigrant poster, featuring almost exclusively non-white asylum seekers with the words 
“Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.”145  This poster was considered so offensive by those 
without the same sentiments that it was reported to police for inciting racial hatred, in breach of 
UK race laws.146  In the time since the Brexit vote, there has been a demonstrable increase in racial 
discrimination.147  While, of course, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship between 
the Brexit campaign and increased racial violence is one of causation rather than mere correlation, 
research does suggest that “violent, hateful language can inflame people who are already inclined 
toward violence and focus their rage.”148   
 3. Brexit’s Effect on Northern Ireland  
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  i. Civil and Political Rights 
 Although voters in Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, its consequences will be no less 
real for them than they are for those in England and Wales who voted in favor of it. Following 
approximately three decades149 of violence between Irish nationalists and unionists, as well as the 
English,150 the “high point and provision culmination of a ‘peace process’” finally occurred with 
the 1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA).151  Although some have attempted to 
diminish the importance of EU membership in the development of the GFA, common membership 
of Ireland and the UK is explicitly referenced in all three strands of the GFA’s plan for governance 
and cooperation.152  So important was EU membership to the peace process that the GFA ends 
with a wish to “develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close 
co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European 
Union.”153  Also significant is the fact that within the UK-Ireland International Agreement to which 
the GFA was annexed is the provision that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would 
legally require the consent of the majority of the people therein.154  Although to most observers 
leaving the EU would intuitively be deemed a “change in the status” of Northern Ireland, the UK 
Supreme Court has rejected this proposition.155  Over fifty-five percent of voters in Northern 
Ireland elected to remain in the EU.156  As the UDHR specifically codifies the right “to take part 
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in the government of [one’s] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives,” and states 
that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government,”157 the UK’s 
disregard of Northern Irish will concerning EU membership arguably already violates international 
human rights law.  
  ii. Threats to the Peace Process and Bodily Safety 
Considering the global optimism about the effects of the GFA in bringing about peace in a 
region plagued for too long by constant conflict, it is only to be expected that what Brexit would 
mean for Northern Ireland would be of such importance as to be referred to simply as “The Irish 
Question.”  The most obvious danger which Brexit presents for those in the six counties of 
Northern Ireland is the uncertainty regarding the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland.158  Though this question is yet to be answered conclusively, Britain has made quite 
clear that after Brexit goes into effect, “there will be no free movement of persons into the UK.”159  
As the Republic has made no indication of its own plans to leave the EU, this presents a clear 
problem, in that it is difficult to see how this policy could be implemented absent a border between 
the Republic and Northern Ireland, of which the Republic has stated it is not in favor as well.160  
Even if the once heavily militarized border could be avoided through use of modern border 
technology, any border at all is likely to dredge up past trauma related to the violence of the 
Troubles for the people of Northern Ireland.161 
This psychological trauma is not the only danger posed by “The Irish Question” and its 
potential solutions.  Although the GFA helped usher in increased stability in the region and 
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significantly less violence, tensions between Northern Irish nationalists, or republicans, and 
unionists remains high.  Just last year, a familiar sound pierced the precarious peace of Derry when 
a car bomb exploded outside of a courthouse.162  Though luckily nobody was injured by the blast, 
it served as a stark reminder that the peace represented by the GFA is fragile.163  A reversion to 
conflict is gravely dangerous to any human rights guarantees: it is nearly uncontestable that 
“violent conflict causes human rights abuses.”164  Those human rights violations in turn frequently 
lead their victims and victims’ allies to oppose the state apparatus, usually by violent means.165  
Northern Ireland is certainly no exception. Throughout the Troubles, England routinely committed 
what are rightfully considered human rights violations, including indefinite detentions as well as 
the highly publicized torturous treatment of sisters Dolours and Marian Price, who were force-fed 
while committing a hunger strike in a British prison after being imprisoned for their roles in a 
scheme to set off several bombs throughout London.166  The pain and degradation faced by the 
Price sisters in being force-fed was so great, and so publicly abhorred, that eventually the British 
government calculated that it was not worth the negative public reaction nor the physical hassle to 
continue the practice.167  Following the conclusion of the Price sisters’ hunger strike, the World 
Medical Association declared that force-feeding was unethical.168  Many activists concerned about 
civil and human rights during this period argued that the practice being labeled unethical rendered 
it torture, in contravention of UDHR Article 5.169 
iii. Economic Human Rights 
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The more complete understanding of human rights which includes economic and labor 
dimensions further clarifies that Brexit will reduce human rights protections for those living in 
Northern Ireland.  One key aspect of the GFA is the establishment of institutions meant to foster 
cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic.170  With the uncertainty 
surrounding trade and labor relations once the UK exits the EU, it is unclear whether these 
institutions will be able to continue operating in such a way as to satisfy the mandates of the peace 
deal.  Specifically, although most Northern Irish employers are based there or in Britain, about 
thirteen percent of Northern Irish employees work for firms owned elsewhere, with a significant 
share of those being in the Republic.171   
In the area of trade, again, uncertainty prevails: because of the position of the island of 
Ireland on the western edge of the UK, Northern Ireland will face issues relating to trade in goods 
with the rest of the EU, as well as with the Republic.172  Even those residents whose jobs will not 
immediately be affected by the deal will lose their current free access to employment within the 
EU, once they are removed from its market.173  Additionally, Northern Ireland has received over 
£600 million annually in EU funding, allocated to farming, research, and  jobs, among other 
initiatives.174  While a loss of economic viability in itself should be deemed a human rights issue, 
economic inequality and lack of opportunity was a significant cause of the Troubles175, and the 
fragile peace will again be threatened should these economic conditions return. 
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IV. The Case for Northern Irish Nationalism 
Like nationalist movements in general, Northern Irish nationalism is difficult to fully define 
and thus its origins are difficult to pinpoint.  However, its modern incarnation originated in the late 
eighteenth century.176  Similar to some other movements, the basis for this Irish nationalism lay in 
ideals of individual rights à la the Enlightenment, and the idea that such ideals could most readily 
be achieved through national popular sovereignty.177  In its original form, Irish nationalism was 
inclusive, rather than cleaved according to a Catholic/Protestant divide, and its main target was 
overcoming political repression.178  Eventually, Irish nationalists did come into conflict with 
unionists who wanted to remain under British rule, almost exclusively along divided religious 
lines.179  In the twentieth century, Irish nationalism ebbed and flowed in vehemence, but 
underlying all phases was one belief: that Britain’s rule over the North was illegitimate as Britain 
was an occupying imperialist force, and because of this it was the Irish “duty to expel them by any 
means necessary.”180   
This section will provide a brief background of another important nationalist movement, 
that of India, which successfully expelled British rule after nearly a century of imperial 
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domination.181  It will then explain what “success” could entail for today’s nationalists in Northern 
Ireland, and how that success could thwart the negative consequences of Brexit. 
A. Nationalism in India 
 The sun never sets on the British Empire. So the old adage went.182  While they might 
develop triteness with overuse, cliches do not become such for no reason, and this one is no 
exception.  At its zenith, the British Empire spanned approximately twenty-five percent of the 
globe.183  Although English conquest began much closer to home,184 the “epicentre” of the Empire 
at its height, and its base for continuous expansion throughout Asia, was India.185  Unlike in Wales, 
Ireland, and Scotland, British rule over India was not initially an outright assertion of political 
rule.186  Rather, the British Crown granted charters for the East India Company which included 
traditional government responsibilities like security for sea routes, running mints, raising armies, 
and administering civil and criminal justice.187  Then, with continuous trade monopolization and 
expansion, the East India Company eventually took control of the nation itself.188   
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Following the Battle of Plassey in 1757, in which the East India Company defeated an 
army of 50,000 with only 3,000 of its own soldiers, the Company parlayed its spoils into still 
further expansion.189 Under the East India Company’s rule (Company Raj),190 Indians were 
precluded from holding office in their own country,191 and although human rights language as we 
know it was not yet used,192 this prohibition and some other conditions for Indians living under 
Company Raj193 would today likely be considered human rights violations.  Eventually, the abuses 
by the Company government brought about a mutinous backlash.194  As a result, the British 
government restructured its hold on India such that it now had direct control rather than through 
the Company proxy.195  Although this was “intended to increase Indian participation in 
governance, … the powerlessness of Indians to determine their own future without the consent of 
the British led to an increasingly adamant national independence movement.”196 
Many people today have a simplistic perception of the nationalist movement in India.197  
In reality, Indian nationalism had much deeper roots, and wider branches. As far back as the 
aftermath of the 1857 mutiny, when ordinary Indians saw their royals prove largely useless, they 
too began to trade historical ideals of natural monarchies for a more western democratic vision and 
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an increase in nationalism.198  And while Gandhi has come to represent the lone figurehead of 
Indian nationalism, the “the movement is perhaps one of the best examples of … and extremely 
wide movement with a common aim” which had “galvanized millions of people of all classes and 
ideologies into political action and brought to its knees a mighty colonial empire.”199  Perhaps 
most significantly, Indian nationalists had their sights set on introducing representative 
government and expanded franchise, a free press, and free expression and association.200 
B. Political Success for Irish Nationalists 
Although the GFA brought to an end the days of rampant violent rebellion by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the related Provisional IRA (Provos), this did not spell the end of 
nationalist sentiment on the island. Probably the most representative figure of its transformation is 
Gerry Adams. Throughout the Troubles, Adams was known as not just a member of the IRA, but 
a veritable leader of the illicit group.201  In 1983, however, Adams was elected to Parliament as a 
member of the Sinn Fein party.202  This served as a powerful example of the transition of many 
Irish nationalists from their roots to players in the political game, who saw more of an opportunity 
to advance their agenda by way of Parliament than car-bombs.203  However, there is no question 
that Sinn Fein is an extension of the republicans of the past; in one particularly telling moment, 
while Adams gave a speech, a man in the crowd shouted to him to “bring back the IRA,” to which 
Adams cheekily replied, “they haven’t gone away you know.”204  After the signing of the GFA, 
by which many Irish republicans felt betrayed at the perceived capitulation to continued British 
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rule, Adams was quick to point out that what he and Sinn Fein had agreed to was not capitulation, 
but a peace deal based on consent, which allowed for the North to unite with the Republic at any 
point when a majority of Northerners would vote to do so.205  The deal was meant not as the end 
of the struggle, but just as the end of one chapter of it, still aimed at “‘deliver[ing] the end of British 
rule in [Ireland].’”206 
1. Protection Against Brexit 
It is this consent which could be the key to protecting against the threats to human rights 
that Brexit represents. As the modern leg of Irish nationalism, Sinn Fein’s policies serve as a good 
marker for the possible alternative to the grim future that continued British rule and leaving the 
EU could create.  Sinn Fein has made clear that it does not support the no-deal Brexit which looms, 
as the only way it would approve of Brexit would be if Northern Ireland was given a special status 
in negotiations with the EU.207  Because Britain has yet to proffer any realistic solutions for the 
protection of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein party leader Mary Lou McDonald has stated that she 
believes it is time for a new vote on reunification with the Republic, as per GFA protocols.208  In 
itself, this course of action would negate the threats to the civil and political rights which Brexit 
threatens, but by extension of the vote’s outcome it would also protect the threatened economic 
rights. Furthermore, it would remove the possibility of a reintroduction of a hard border on the 
Island, eliminating the chance of this leading to renewed conflict at the dangerous levels seen for 
the three decades of the Troubles. 
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Like the nationalist movement in India, a revived Northern Irish nationalist movement 
could rally its highly variant political factions around the common cause of ending British control, 
in the name of democratic ideals and human rights protection209.  
V. Conclusion 
The term “nationalism” has been construed too broadly, disregarding the nuances and even 
significant differences between different nationalist movements.210  This generalization has caused 
a consensus that nationalism threatens human rights.211 But it is reductionist, and does not 
accurately reflect the differences between different nationalist movements which deserve 
highlight. From only three examples of modern nationalist movements, it is abundantly clear that 
this one term is insufficient to describe such varied political movements. Thus, it is true that 
Hungarian nationalism and British nationalism are likely to diminish human rights, while it is a 
fallacy to suggest the same about Irish nationalism, which does not share the same xenophobic 
roots and which does not have the same goals. 
1 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, another interesting facet of human rights 
which presents an interesting aspect of the Northern Irish struggle is minority language rights. As 
Nutt & Gray aptly point out, the common nationalist boogey-men of xenophobia and ethnic 
discrimination often arise from “the suppression of national identities by imperialist states” rather 
than “’atavistic’ antagonisms.”212 Like economic rights, language rights are a component of human 
rights that is often excluded from discussion. 213 Language rights in the context of human rights 
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centers not on the right to speak a minority language in one’s private sphere (a right already 
subsumed within existing fundamental human rights), but instead with “the right to maintain and 
use that particular language in the public, or civic realm – most often in . . . education.”214 In 
Northern Ireland, language rights play a key role in the nationalist fight.215  While in recent years, 
both Wales and Scotland have achieved legislative success at protecting their language rights, an 
equivalent right in Northern Ireland has reached an impasse.216  A full fifteen years after the St. 
Andrews Agreement was signed, whereby the British government agreed to introduce legislation 
known as the Irish Language Act, its passage remains unfulfilled.217  This Act would reverse some 
of the dangers to minority rights to which numerous international rights-based organizations have 
called attention, by providing for official recognition of the Irish language, creating a duty for 
public authorities to make Irish-language materials available in public services, repeal the 
Administration of Justice Act that mandates the use of English only in judicial proceedings, and 
crucially, creates a duty on the Department of Education to facilitate use of the language in the 
education system.218   While this Act has been proposed for over a decade and allegedly has support 
from many sides,219 it remains to be passed, with arguments against it levelling, inter alia,  that it 
would unfairly give Irish a place above other languages, that it would threaten the “Britishness” of 
the North, and that it would cause discrimination against Northern Irish unionists.220  Language 
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rights in Northern Ireland, however, are just another example of a demonstrable way in which 
nationalist political success could protect human rights in the region. 
 What these various case studies in nationalism make clear is that it is important to better 
understand the differences in political movements, so as not to succumb to the valid criticism of 
failing to understand them fully before condemning them. Thus, it would be helpful for 
conversations around nationalism to center the Irish case as a means to exemplify that nationalism 
does not inherently contravene human rights, so that it becomes easier to recognize the instances 
of nationalism that do.  
 
 
 
